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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
BROKERS-

REGULATION

AND CONDUCT

OF BusINESs-

WHETHER OR NOT A

REAL ESTATE SALESMAN IS A PERSON ENTITLED TO INVOKE PROVISIONS OF LAW
REGULATING REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND PROVIDING FOR FORFEITURE OF CERTII-

CATE OF REGISTRATION-In the case of Sigler v. Massachusetts Bonding &,
Insurance Company,' it appeared that plaintiff, a real estate salesman,
earned certain commissions but was not paid the same by his brokeremployer. After reducing such claim to judgment, plaintiff then sued the
defendant surety company on its bond given to insure the faithful observance by the broker of the requirements of the applicable statute. 2 The
trial court held in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff
was not entitled to the benefit of the bond, but, on appeal, such judgment
was reversedB
The business of conducting a real estate brokerage office has been
subjected to extensive regulation in recent years, principally along the
1 71 Ohio App. 425, 50 N.E. (2d) 390 (1941). The case, though decided in 1941,
was first published in the Northeastern Reporter advance sheet dated September
15, 1943.
2 Direct action against the surety in such cases was held proper in La Rose v.
Alliance Casualty Co., (La. App.) 150 So. 455 (1933).
8 Doyle, P. J., dissented on the theory that plaintiff did not fall in the class of
persons whom the legislature intended to protect.
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line of requiring registration or hcense. 4 The license so granted is usually
conditioned upon the due observance of the requirements of the law,
with provision for forfeiture in case violation occurs. 5 To provide further
protection, some states require the broker to furnish a surety bond and
permit suit thereon by any person who may be damaged by the broker's
failure to conduct his business in accordance with the statute.6 One common provision found in such statutes, however, requires the broker "to
account for or to remit for any moneys coming into his possession which
belong to others, ' 7 but the statutes do not elaborate upon who such
"others" may be.8 It was this ambiguity which required solution in the
instant case and upon which point no precedent appears to exist. 9
The undoubted purpose in enacting statutes of this character was
to protect the public by requiring that the real estate brokerage business
be conducted only by honest and competent persons. 10 Such protection
was also probably primarily intended for the particular benefit of that
part of the general public who would have occasion to employ real estate
brokers as agents in the handling of transactions relating to real
4 Semenow, Survey of Real Estate License Laws (prepared for The National
Association of License Law Officials), Rev. Ed., 1941, p. 69, presents a chart
showing such statutes have been enacted in all states, including the District of
Columbia, with the exception of Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota. Though not uniform, the
statutes are substantially alike.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 114 , §8.
6 Bonding provisions are found in nine states and the District of Columbia. A
typical provision is that concerned in the instant case, found in Page's Ohio
Gen. Code Ann., §6373-35, which reads: "No real estate broker's license shall be

issued until . . . a bond . . . in the sum of $1,000 . . . shall be filed . . .

conditioned upon the faithful observance of all the provisions of this act and
shall also indemnify any person who may be damaged by a failure on the part
,of the applicant . . . to conduct his business in accordance with . . . this act."

Where bonding provisions are found, the amount of the bond varies. It is $1,000
in the states of Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Utah and Washington;
is $2,500 in Arizona and the District of Columbia; and may be as high as $10,000
in Louisiana. West Virginia requires a bond of $2,000 from non-resident licensees
only. See Semenow, op. cit., pp. 88-9. No such provision is contained in the Illinois
statute.
7 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann., §6373-42(5); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 114 , §8(f).
8 The term "others" clearly includes customers of the broker according to
Walton v. Carly, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 183, 45 P. (2d) 438 (1935); Goody v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 53 Ida. 523, 25 P. (2d) 1045 (1933); Manale v. Harris, (La. App.)
165 So. 339 (1936); Boisseau v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., (La. App.) 149 So.
175 (1933). It has been held not to protect one who deals with a broker as a
known contracting party, since in such case the broker is not then practicing the
"business of real estate brokerage," according to Woods v. National Surety Co.,
27 Ariz. 479, 233 P. 900 (1925).
9 A failure to share commissions with an independent broker was before the
court in J. B. Green Realty Co. v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 130 Fla. 220,
177 So. 535 (1937), where such failure was held to justify suspension of license.
10 Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 48 P. (2d) 104 (1935); Roman v.
Lobe, 243 N. Y. 51, 152 N.E. 461 (1926); Johnson v. Baker, 149 Tenn. 613, 259 S.W.
909 (1924). See also 12 C. J. S., Brokers, §8.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
property." That relationship hardly exists between a real estate broker
and his salesman, for the latter is not dealing with the broker as would
a principal but rather as one who owes to his employer certain legal
duties. It could, therefore, be reasoned that statutes of the type in question were not passed for the purpose of insuring to the employee of
the broker the collection of his commission, hence his only protection
would lie in the common-law duty of a principal to compensate his agent
for services rendered.' 2 It would also seem that he is not one of the
"others" referred to in such statutes.
The court in the instant case, however, concluded that since the
Ohio statute required that the bond be worded for the protection of "any
person" damaged by a violation of the statute, that phrase must necessarily be all-inclusive, and should not be limited to those who, as principals, had hired the services of a licensed broker. 13 The court also gave
content to the phrase "any moneys . . . which belong to others," by
holding that the salesman's share of the commission was an undivided
part of the total price collected by the broker from the sale of property,
hence was no different than the net balance due the customer. Since
the net balance was clearly "moneys . . . which belong to others," the
court reasoned that the gross sum must be in the same category.
The precise question cannot very well arise in Illinois as the statute
of this state makes no provision for a bond. It does, however, provide
for the forfeiture of license and complaint might be made, on similar
facts, for such relief. It may be of some value to note that the Department
of Registration and Education, charged with the enforcement of that
statute, has prepared certain instructions for the preparation of real
estate complaints. One such instruction reads: "Be sure that your complaint involves illegal or unethical real estate practice. This Department
will not be used as a collection agency. Failure to pay a commission is
not the basis of a valid complaint."'1 4 The Department has, therefore,
apparently construed the Illinois statute to apply for the protection of
the customer only and not for the protection of the real estate salesman.
It might well be that if it appeared that the broker made a constant
practice of withholding commissions from his agents and salesmen, such
practice would bring into question the honesty and integrity of the broker
and thus become a valid basis for a revocation of his license. But to
allow a salesman to institute proceedings to secure revocation merely
on the basis of one isolated instance of a commission withheld would not
n Firpo v. Murphy, 72 Cal. App. 249, 236 P. 968 (1925); Mapes v. Foster, 38
Wyo. 244, 266 P. 109 (1928).
12 Jarusz v. Namon, 245 M1l.App. 600 (1927).
IsFailure to pay commissions is not specifically made a violation of the
statute. It might, however, be deemed such, by inference, from the catch-all
phrase that "any other conduct . . . which constitutes dishonest dealing" Is
ground for forfeiture of license. See Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann., 16373-42(6); Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 114 , §8(i).
14 See pamphlet entitled Instructions for Preparation of Real Estate Complaints,
prepared by Division of Registration for the Department of Registration and
Education, Springfield, p. 4.
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seem to be within the general purpose of such legislation since it would
have nothing to do with affording protection to the public. In this light,
it is doubtful if the Ohio decision would be followed in Illinois.
MARY JANE SACCONE

OR NOT CARRIER, IN WHOSE
CARRIzIs-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERs-WHETH
DEPOT VAGRANTS TEND TO CONGREGATE, IS BOUND TO ANTICIPATE CIvMUNAL
ASSAULT BY VAGRANT UPON PASSENGER HENCE UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE CARE

TO PREVENT SUCH OccnRENczr,-The case of Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad Company' involved a suit by an habitual passenger against defendant carrier to recover damages for personal injury on the ground that she
had been criminally attacked by a vagrant while she was waiting for a
train at an unpoliced station. Judgment for the plaintiff, reversed in the
Appellate Court, was reinstated and affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court when it held that the defendant had been negligent in failing to
provide a guard at the station even though it had complied with all of the
rules of the Illinois Commerce Commission, particularly those relating to
the lighting and heating of stations.
While carriers owe to their passengers the highest degree of care
when on the trains, only ordinary care is the due of such passengers
when at the stations and depots. 2 Furthermore, a carrier is only bound to
expect passengers to shelter themselves at the station for no more than
a reasonable time before train-time.3 Liability in the instant case, however, appears to have been predicated upon the fact that the defendant
should have anticipated that passengers might be attacked by strangers
while waiting at the station hence was obliged to provide protection
against such possibility. The theory upon which such liability depends is
worthy of examination.
It can hardly be based upon a breach of contract to carry safely
since it cannot be said that a railroad represents itself as selling police
protection as well as transportation. In fact, quite the contrary would
seem to be the case, for the decisions in which such argument has been
made have resulted in a denial of liability. For example, it was held
that the robbery of a passenger on the car steps, absent proof of the
ability of the carrier's agents to protect or of refusal to try to protect
4
against armed gunmen, was not enough to impose liability. Likewise,
and
plaintiff,
where a tramp boarded a car between stations, robbed
of
no
possibility
was
disappeared before the next stop, so that there
1 383 Inl. 366, 50 N.E. (2d) 497 (1943), reversing 315 Ill. App. 599, 43 N.E. (2d)
604 (1942).
2 Davis v. South Side El. R. R. Co., 292 Ill. 378, 127 N.E. 66 (1920).
a Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Laloge, 113 Ky. 896, 69 S.W. 795 (1902). In the instant
case, plaintiff had been riding on the same night train for a long period of time.
Her status as a passenger seemed sufficiently established while she waited for
such train at a regular station. Her appearance there was reasonably close to
train-time.
4 Repp v. Indianapolis, C. & S. Traction Co., 184 Ind. 671, 111 N.E. 614 (1916).
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defendant anticipating such occurrence or of guarding against it, re5
covery was denied.
The liability cannot be said to depend upon the presence or absence
of defendant's employees, for that fact has been held immaterial. Recovery has been denied where securities were lost by hold-up in a car
where no employee was present.6 Conversely, the presence of some
twenty-eight policemen in attendance about the station where the assault
occurred has not led to liability. 7 The main test in such cases turns on
whether or not the occurrences could be anticipated. If, however, an
employee is present when the difficulty occurs, the carrier might be
held if such agent fails to discharge the duty he owes to at least attempt
to protect the passenger.8 The same result will follow if the employee
is absent when it is his duty to be present and watchful. 9 But none
of these cases approach the doctrine in the instant case.
There is, moreover, a fundamental general rule that no duty exists
to anticipate the wilful or criminal actions of others.10 While apparent
exceptions to that rule may be found, such cases may be adequately
distinguished. Thus, the negligently wrongful or instinctive acts of third
persons will not serve to exonerate the first actor if such could reasonably be anticipated, as in the well-known "squib" case," because such
subsequent acts are then regarded as part of the natural chain of events
put in motion by the original wrongful act. In the same way, one allowing an inexperienced or intoxicated person to drive a car will suffer
liability in case of accident because some accident was foreseeable,
hence a duty was owed and breached. 12 Such was also the case where a
contractor left quicklime on a sidewalk and the substance was thrown
at a street-car by small boys. 13 There, by reason of a combination of
attractive nuisance and the acts of human but not entirely responsible
agents, since the boys were technically incapable of committing a crime,
the prior fault of the contractor was enough. Other cases illustrate the
principle that a person who places another in a position to defraud
should be answerable to persons thereby damaged. 14 But in all of them,
5 Beasley v. Hines, 143 Ark. 54, 219 S.W. 757 (1920).
6 Weeks v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 50, 28 Am. Rep. 104 (1878).
7 Duner v. Hudson & M. R. Co., 264 App. Div. 229, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (1942).
8 Terre Haute, Indianapolis & Eastern Traction Co. v. Scott, 197 Ind. 587, 150
N.E. 777 (1926).
9 Pullman Co. v. Culbreth, 2 F. (2d) 540 (1924).
10 In Ward v. Southern Ry. Co., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934), the criminal
acts of negroes in throwing coal from cars were held unforeseeable although
such acts had taken place repeatedly over a period of thirty-two years and ultimately resulted in the death of plaintiff's intestate. A third person's forgery of
old, "spent" bills of lading has been held not open to anticipation: Saugerties
Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 236 N. Y. 425, 141 N.E. 904 (1923). Three judges
dissented.
11 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. K. B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
12 Gordon v. Bedard, 265 Mass. 408, 164 N.E. 374 (1929); Pfaehler v. Ten Cent
Taxi Co., 198 S. C. 476, 18 S.E. (2d) 331 (1942).
'3 Katz v. Helbing, 215 Cal. 449, 10 P. (2d) 1001 (1932).
14 In Benenson v. National Surety Co., 235 App. Div. 294, 257 N. Y. S. 13 (1932),
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the defendant's prior fault could be regarded as the initial impetus
which produced the ultimate result.
In the absence of such exceptional cases, and the instant case cannot
be said to be one of them, the ordinary reasonable and prudent man
cannot logically be expected to anticipate criminal conduct and should
not be under a duty to protect against the same. Any such criminal acts
should be regarded as the sole, or at least a superseding, cause and it
was so regarded at common law. 15 Such rule has not yet been repudiated, and should be changed only if, and to the extent that, criminal
acts might become so common and frequent in a given community that
the average man could be said to expect and anticipate them at any
time. As a matter of fact, the cases still generally refuse to recognize
any exception to that principle. The following recent cases are merely
illustrative of this fact. In one, though it was deemed carelessness to
permit two high-school students to have access to a cabinet containing
chemicals without providing adequate supervision, still their criminal
act in stealing the chemicals was held to supersede such prior negligence
so that another student, obtaining chemicals from the thieves and injured by an explosion thereof, was regarded as their victim and not
that of the school.' 0 In another case plaintiff was thrown from the balcony to the floor below when other patrons drew gun and knife during
an argument at a boxing match. It was held that the prior shouting and
excitement, natural at such a place, created no duty to be particularly
watchful for plaintiff's safety. 17 Again, although a disturbance was
caused by a guest at the closing of a night club when he was ejected,
it was held that it could not be expected that he would come back, break
the door, and shoot another patron.18 Similarly, when railroad passengers had been warned to desist from throwing paper cups at one another
and the conductor had gone to another car after they had desisted, it
was held there was no duty to expect a resumption of the horseplay,
nor that as a result thereof a passenger would be hurt by a hard object
a surety company left fully authenticated unfilled bonds about its office. One of
them was stolen, completed in the amount of $100,000, and accepted by plaintiff
in reliance on the perfect authentication of the bond. The company's initial carelessness was held the basis of liability. So, too, in Insuranshares Corporation v.
Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F. Supp. 126 (1941), it was held that there was a
"realizable likelihood" that criminal acts were present where a corporation
placed several persons in a position where they could manipulate sales of stock
so as to defraud.
15 In Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill. 220 (1876), a sheriff negligently permitted the
escape of a prisoner who was on trial for assaulting plaintiff. The subsequent
criminal act of the escaped prisoner in again assaulting plaintiff was held not
foreseeable.
16 Frace v. Long Beach City High School Dist., 58 Cal. App. (2d) 556, 137 P.
(2d) 60 (1943).
17 Shayne v. Coliseum Bldg. Corp., 270 Ill. App. 547 (1933). Perhaps the court
felt that spectators at boxing matches expect a certain amount of excitement
among other spectators as a part of the main attraction, hence could be deemed
to assume part of the risk.
18 Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 316, 143 S.W. (2d) 1042 (1940).
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concealed in a cup. 19 In short, the criminal acts of third persons have
heretofore been held, both in Illinois and elsewhere, to supersede any
original wrongful act on defendant's part.
Perhaps the closest case to the instant one, a decision relied on most
strongly to support such holding, is that of Chicago and Alton Railroad
Company v. Pillsbury.20 Plaintiff there was badly beaten by strikers who
invaded a train after some non-striking workers had been picked up at
a special stop under a police escort. The original act of negligence
therein was held to consist of stopping a train at an unusual place to
pick up such workers and in thereafter failing to keep them sufficiently
segregated from the other passengers. 21 That case, however, differs
from the instant one in that first, the duty owed to a passenger inside a
train is always greater than the duty owed him at a station, and second,
because acts of violence were there definitely known to have occurred
and to be still threatened. In another Illinois case, a taxicab company
was held liable to a passenger injured by strikers because the defendant
knew of the strike and of previous acts of violence while the plaintiff
had come into the city too recently to be aware of the situation hence
could not be said to have assumed the risk.22 In contrast thereto, the
absence of either element of striking or of prior violence has usually led
to a denial of recovery 28 for the carrier cannot be said to be under a
duty to so armor its cars as to prevent injury by broken glass. 24 Even
where a strike was in progress and a preceding street-car had been
stoned by strikers shortly before, still since neither the company nor the
driver of the following car knew of that fact, it was held there was no
negligence in continuing on the journey hence recovery was denied to a
passenger riding in the second street-car. 25 Again, in the absence of
strike, but where plaintiff and the driver could see boys throwing things
across a street in front of a street-car, it was held not negligent to
proceed because it would reasonably be expected the boys would cease
their acts while the street-car passed. 26 In the light of such holdings,
the decision in the instant case appears extreme for there was no proof
therein of prior violence such as might have served to put the carrier
27
on notice that repetition thereof was to be expected.
19 Thompson v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 99 W. Va. 207, 128 S.E. 110 (1925).
20 123 Ill. 9, 14 N.E. 22 (1887).
21 The final decision therein was reached only after a rehearing. The original
majority opinion became the dissenting opinion. See 8 N.E. 803 (1886).
22 Rose v. City of Chicago, 317 IM. App. 1, 45 N.E. (2d) 717 (1943).
28 Woas v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 664, 96 S.W. 1017 (1906).
24 Fewings v. Mendenhall, 88 Minn. 336, 93 N.W. 127 (1903).
25 Bosworth v. Union R. Co., 26 R. I. 309, 58 A. 982 (1904).
26 Shepard v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 236 Mo. App. 1118, 162 S.W. (2d)
318 (1942).
27 The court did, however, indicate that by allowing vagrants to congregate,
loiter and sleep in the depot waiting room, the carrier permitted a condition to
exist which amounted to a menace to public peace and from which some unlawful act might reasonably be anticipated.
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The so-called "Hobo-Hollow" case 28 comes closest to the problem
here involved for it did depart from the general rule that criminal acts
are to be regarded as a superseding cause. In that case liability was
imposed on a carrier because a female passenger was raped after the
conductor had negligently carried her past her station, had compelled
her to leave the train instead of arranging for her transportation back
to her original destination, and forced her to walk alone at night through
a notoriously dangerous neighborhood. That case may, however, be explained on the ground that there was a clear breach of contract arising
from the negligent act of defendant in carrying plaintiff to the wrong
station. In the instant case the defendant did nothing wrongful nor did
it fail or neglect to do anything it had previously done.
In a negligence action, the court might well go to the extent of
saying that if there is an act by defendant sine qua non of the injury,
liability should not be avoided because of an intervening act of another
even though, but for such intervention, no injury or damage would have
resulted. 29 It is submitted that such is not the instant case for there
had been no prior assault or difficulty at or near the station in question, 30
the defendant's operation of its trains was as usual, and, even though
the evidence tended to show that the police knew the neighborhood was
infested with vagrants,3 1 they were not the agents of the defendant and
gave it no warning of the existing conditions or of their inability to cope
32
with them.
Carriers operating in Illinois must now, however, be particularly
alert to the fact that, if they do not cancel their station stops at night,
it is their duty to provide police protection for passengers for a reasonable time prior to each scheduled stop. They may not, apparently, rely
on the activity of the regular police forces.
G. MAscmcNoT
28 Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921).

Cusatis v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 152 Pa. Super. 193, 31 A. (2d) 572 (1943).
testimony that she had repeatedly complained to defendant's
agents of the presence of vagrants sleeping in the waiting room, making her
afraid to seek shelter there even in inclement weather, was countered by defendant's evidence that not once had plaintiff ever been molested or even spoken
to in the five years she used the station prior to the occurrence involved in the
instant case. Employees of the defendant also denied seeing vagrants around the
premises at any time. See 383 Ill. 366 at 373, 50 N.E. (2d) 497 at 500-1.
31 Police officers testified to some twenty-five or thirty arrests of vagrants on
the station platforms for loitering, and of several attempts to break up the "hobo
jungle" which existed nearby. The statement of facts does not disclose, except
by inference, that the defendant knew of these police efforts: 383 Ill. 366 at 372,
50 N.E. (2d) 497 at 500.
32 Though the disputed facts were found in plaintiff's favor, it would seem as
though defendant was never adequately warned of the possibility of danger. If,
absent such notice, the carrier is to be held in cases such as this, its liability
would seem to spring from the fact that by the operation of trains, requiring
the use of tracks, freight cars, depots and the like, it creates a condition likely to
attract vagrants who are commonly known to be offenders against the public
peace. The social need for transportation should outweigh a liability based on so
slender a foundation.
29

0 Plaintiff's
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CORPORATIONS-FoREIGN CoRPoRATIONs-WEETnER OR NOT FOREIGN CORPORAMERCHANDISE WITHIN STATE FROM WHICH TO FIL
ORDERS, Is DOING BusINEss WITHIN TE STATE SO AS TO BE AMENABLE TO SERVICE
OF PROCESS-In the recent case of Pergl v. U.S. Axle Company,' the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, had for several years been manufacturing and shipping automobile axles to a warehouse in Illinois. The wareTION, MAINTAINING STOCK OF

house owner supplied the axles to jobbers named in a list compiled by the
defendant, receiving payment by check or cash. Apparently the ware-

house owner did not have to procure prior approval of such sales from
the defendant although, on completion of the sale, the check or cash
received was forwarded to the defendant in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff
purchased an axle from one of the jobbers and installed the same in his
automobile. The axle proved defective, and plaintiff was injured as a

result. In a suit for personal injury, plaintiff caused the foreign corporation to be served through the warehouse owner, declaring the latter to be
an agent of the corporation. Defendant, upon limited appearance, filed a

motion to quash the service on the ground that it was not doing business
in Illinois, that the warehouse owner was not its agent, and, if there was
any relationship between the two, it was that of bailor and bailee. This
motion was sustained by the trial court, but on appeal by plaintiff, the
Appellate Court for the First District reversed, holding that the corporation was doing business within the state and that the warehouse owner
was an agent.
In order to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has
not been licensed to do business in the state and has not appointed an
authorized agent therein,2 two things are essential, namely: (1) there
must be service on some agent within the state, and (2) the foreign corporation must be doing business in the state.3 Sufficient facts appear in
the instant case to indicate an agency relationship between the warehouseman and the defendant corporation, for the warehouse owner could
transfer the axles to jobbers without getting the approval of the corporation, and could receive payment for the same not as vendor but for the
purpose of forwarding the amounts collected to the corporation in Pennsylvania. It could hardly be contended by the corporation that the jobbers did not get complete title to the axles so purchased, hence the
warehouse owner must have been an agent and not a mere bailee.
Service on an agent is sufficient to bind the foreign corporation, 4 particularly if that agent has power to represent the corporation in the
1 320 Ill. App. 115, 50 N.E. (2d) 115 (1943).
2111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §§157.102, 157.109, and 157.111.
3 Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 F. 566 (1922).

See also Eulette, Service of Process upon Foreign Corporations-Constitutional
Limitations Imposed by Judicial Construction of the Due Process Clauses, 20
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 287 (1942), and Munsert, Doing Business in a State
for the Purpose of Service of Process on a Foreign Corporation, 13 CHICAGO-K NT
REviEw 328 (1935).
4 Lamont v. S. R. Moss Cigar Co., 218 Ill. App. 435 (1920); Hall v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 298 Ill. App. 83, 18 N.E. (2d) 388 (1938).
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transaction of some part of the business contemplated by its charter.'
The first element is, then, clearly satisfied.
It has been said many times that the question of whether or not a
foreign corporation is doing business in a state depends primarily on the
facts of the case,6 but it would appear that a consideration of such facts
is utilized to determine whether there is sufficient corporate activity to
make it reasonable to bring the foreign corporation before the courts of
the state.7 Thus it has been held that where textbooks were shipped to
a warehouse within the state, to be supplied to correspondence school
pupils with whom contracts had previously been made, the foreign cor8
poration was doing business therein. In much the same way, the solicitation of orders by those authorized to receive payment, with machinery
being constantly shipped to fill such orders, was deemed sufficient to
9
treat the foreign corporation as doing business within the state. In
another example, goods were shipped and stored within the state and
solicitors took orders and filled them from the stored goods. The foreign
corporation was held, likewise, to be doing business in the state in which
the goods were so stored. 10 Such cases support the conclusion that the
corporation, in the instant case, also met the second requirement for
valid service of process.
Considering the claim that there was merely a bailment relationship,
it would appear that the existence of such relationship would be of no
avail to the corporate defendant, even if it were proven. In that regard,
it may be noted that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
speaking in Mas v. Orange-Crush Company," said: "And it has often
been held that a foreign corporation which ships goods in bulk into
another state and there holds them in a warehouse for use in filling
orders is doing business in that state."'12 Such doctrine has also been
voiced in other decisions,'8 although it is true that an earlier Illinois
case holds that where goods are stored in a warehouse for the purpose
of filling orders, but approval of the order has to be obtained from the
corporation in the home state, the latter is not to be regarded as doing
business in the state. 14 It should be remembered, however, that in the
instant case the warehouse owner was not required to get sales ap376, 95 N.E. 460 (1911).
Booz v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 250 Ill.
6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed.
1479 (1914); Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556,
67 L. Ed. 996 (1923); Rendleman v. Niagara Sprayer Co., 16 F. (2d) 122 (1925).
7 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. (2d) 139 (1930). See also Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871 (1919).
App. 509 (1909).
8 International Text-Book Co. v. Mueller, 149 Ill.
9 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. FA.
1479 (1914).
10 Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Knapp, 101 Minn. 432, 112 N.W. 989 (1907).
11 99 F. (2d) 675 (1938).
12 99 F. (2d) 675 at 678.
Is Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Bros. Co., 46 F. (2d) 870 (1925);
Liquid Veneer Corporation v. Smuckler, 90 F. (2d) 196 (1937).
App. 248 (1914).
14 The Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Thede, 186 Ill.
5
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proval from the foreign corporation, and, in contrast to such Illinois
15
decision, a later Washington case holds directly to the contrary.
No sound reason exists as to why the mere approval of the order
in the home state of the foreign corporation should save it from the
charge of doing business within another state, particularly when delivery
is to occur from stocks of goods located there.'8 There is then, no assurance that the earlier Illinois decision would be followed in a later case,
especially now that the courts appear to be more lenient in determining
what facts are necessary to amount to a doing of business within a state

by a foreign corporation.

A. C.

SCHWARZ, JR.

CORPOPTINS-O ICES AND AGENTs-MAY PLAINTxFF, WHO SuccEssuuY
MAINTAINS STOCKHOLDER'S DERIvATIVE SUIT AND THEREBY BE.NmTrs THE COuFORA-

TION, BE REIMBuRsED FOR NECESSARY EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY's FES INqcuED
IN SucH LrrIGATIoN-In Bingham v. Ditzler' the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, instituted a derivative action to compel the restoration to his corporation of moneys unlawfully appropriated by the officers and directors.
Plaintiff's complaint included a prayer for the allowance of attorney's
fees. The chancellor found in plaintiff's favor on the major issues and
2
directed that an accounting be taken of the amounts due the corporation,
but decreed that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not entitled to recover
attorney's fees. In reversing such finding, the Appellate Court for the
First District held that where plaintiff successfully conducts his suit, so
that a benefit flows to the corporation therefrom, he is entitled to recover
the necessary expenses of such litigation, including attorney's fees.
The opinion does not make it clear whether plaintiff sought such
compensation from the individual defendants or from the fund created
by the litigation. If recovery was sought from the former, such liability
could only arise by reason of contract or statute.3 Since no contract was
involved, personal liability, if any, would have to rest upon statute.
Section 42 of the Business Corporation Act 4 provides for the liability
of corporate directors in eight enumerated instances, no one of which
was involved in the instant case. That section, however, also expressly
provides that any liability thereby created is "in addition to any other
15 State ex rel. Kerr Glass Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 166 Wash. 41, 8 P. (2d)
368 (1931).

16 Of course, title to the merchandise will pass from seller to buyer only at
such time and place as the parties to the contract intend the same should be transferred: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §18. If, by the contract, title is not to pass
until the goods are delivered, the foreign corporation, though requiring acceptance
of the order in its home state, is clearly doing business at the place where
delivery is to occur: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §19(5).
1 320 Ill. App. 88, 49 N.E. (2d) 812 (1943).
2 Such decree was affirmed in Bingham v. Ditzler, 309 Ill. App. 581, 33 N.E.
(2d) 939 (1941), and leave to appeal was denied: 310 Ill. App. xiii. The cause was
returned to the trial court for the purpose of taking the accounting.
sRitter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N.E. (2d) 41 (1943). See notes in CmcAoo-KEuT
L&w RL-nw, Vol. 20, p. 83; Vol. 21, p. 30; and Vol. 22, p. 27.
4 111 Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.42.
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liabilities imposed by law." The effect of such language has not yet
been construed in Illinois, but it would seem to be limited to permit
recovery only of losses incurred by wrongful conduct on the part of
the directors, since that was the nature of their common-law liability. 5
It is doubtful, then, if the individual defendants could have been charged
with the item for attorney's fees and the court might, by inference from
its silence, be regarded as rejecting any such claim, if one was in fact
made.
The Appellate Court, in reversing, did direct the trial court to determine the reasonable value of the legal services rendered by plaintiff's attorney and ordered it to make allowance therefor from all moneys
6
received by the corporation as a result of the prosecution of the cause.
The charge was, therefore, to be made against the fund rather than
the individual defendants. It is on this point that no prior determination
of an Illinois court appears to exist, 7 but it involves a common equitable principle that a party who, at his own expense, has maintained
a successful suit for the preservation, protection, or increase of a common fund or who has created and brought into court a fund in which
others may share, should be reimbursed for his labor,8 even though no
statute authorizes such compensation. 9 The rule has been said to rest
upon the ground that "where one litigant has borne the burden and expense of the litigation that has inured to the benefit of others as well as
to himself, those who have shared in the benefits should contribute to
the expense."' 0
As applied to corporate problems like that in the instant case, it
has been uniformly held in other jurisdictions that a stockholder who
institutes and successfully maintains a suit of this character, whether
to regain corporate property fraudulently disposed of," to defeat a pro13
is enposed fraudulent conveyance,' 2 or to remedy other like wrongs,
5 Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N.E. 676 (1887), affirming 17 1M. App. 531 (1885);
Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N.E. 530 (1890). See also Kilby v. Movius Land &
Loan Co., 55 N. D. 830, 215 N.W. 284 (1927).
6 320 Il. App. 88 at 99, 49 N.E. (2d) 812 at 816.
7 Merle v. Beifeld, 275 Ill. 594, 114 N.E. 369 (1916), in fact involved the
question, for the trial court's decree allowed plaintiff an attorney's fee. The
decree was reversed, but the upper court refused to consider the precise question
since error had not been properly assigned thereon.
8 49 A. L. R. 1145. The annotator cites Abend v. Endowment Fund Commission,
174 Ill. 96. 50 N.E. 1052 (1898), and Stahl v. Stahl, 166 Ill. App. 236 (1911), but
both such cases involved the efforts of trustees to protect or augment the trust
estate. In Kadish v. Chicago Co-operative Brewing Ass'n, 35 Inl. App. 411 (1890), a
creditor who sued to wind up an insolvent corporation was denied compensation
when it appeared that he was also a stockholder, liable for the corporate debts.
9 The statute regarding partition expressly provides for an allowance of fees:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 106, §40. It has been held, however, that such allowance
does not depend on the statute but upon general equitable principles: Ames v.
Ames, 151 Ill. 280, 37 N.E. 890 (1894).
10 49 A. L. R. 1145 at 1152.
11 Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Ida. 599, 18 P. (2d) 288 (1933).
12 Winkelman v. General Motors Corporation, 48 F. Supp. 485 (1942) and 48 F.
Supp. 504 (1942).
'3 Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, 290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1935);
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titled to an allowance from the funds or property thus recovered for
his expenses, including attorney's fees. The fact that the particular plaintiff's holdings in the corporation are so minute that he will personally
gain little from the fund so realized has been held insufficient to defeat such allowance. 14 Denial of reimbursement has, however, occurred
15
where the plaintiff failed to produce a benefit, or where it appeared
his action was groundless for failure to exhaust his remedy within the
16
corporation.
The social justification for such a rule is readily apparent. It has
been said that if reimbursement were not permitted "the practical effect would be the same as if the suits were prohibited and the small
stockholder remediless, for the expenses in most cases would exceed
the increase in the value of his stock, resulting in a net loss . . . Yet it
is to the interest of society that the stockholder not only be permitted
to bring suit . . . but that he be encouraged to take the initiative. Assuring the stockholder that, if successful, he will not be obliged personally, to pay the entire cost of the suit is hardly too much inducement.
He still takes all the hazards of defeat .... ,17 If it should be argued
that the individual directors, whose fault necessitated the litigation, should
be called upon to foot the bill, the simple answer is that the legislature
may impose such liability any time they may see fit to do so.18 Until
they do, the instant case must be regarded as being within the general
view and the outcome thereof one which might have been anticipated.
It goes without saying that the ruling will be welcomed by minority
stockholders and their counsel.
C. P. Divracz~zo

Shaw v. Harding, 306 Mass. 441, 28 N.E. (2d) 469 (1940); Baker v. Cohn, 40 N.Y.S.
(2d) 623 (1943). See also Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
(Perm. Ed.), Vol. 3, §989 et seq.
14 Winkelman v. General Motors Corporation, 48 F. Supp. 504 (1942), in which
plaintiff held 10 shares out of 43,000,000 shares outstanding and personally gained
about 10c per share. See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F. (2d) 231
(1943), where plaintiff held 150 shares of some 800,000 outstanding and benefited
to the extent of about $3.00, yet was allowed $3,000 for counsel fees in addition
to other expenses.
15 Wolfes v. Paragon Refining Co., 74 F. (2d) 193 (1935); New York Dock Co.
v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 844 (1939); Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa.
335, 172 A. 678 (1934); Boothe v. Summit Coal Min. Co., 72 Wash. 679, 131 P. 252
(1913). Recovery of a judgment is not enough, but collection thereof is essential:
Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S.E. 291 (1929).
16 See dicta in Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Mach. Works, 138 Iowa 456, 114
N. W. 619, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 729 (1908).
1T Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 39 Col. L. Rev.
(1939) 784 at 791.
IsFor comparable statutes, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 13, §13, and Ch. 79,
§58, in case of suits for wages; Ch. 114, §117, for suits involving damage to grain
shipments; Ch. 47, §10, for dismissal of eminent domain proceedings; and Ch. 73,
§767, for vexatious refusal to pay proceeds of insurance.
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INSURANCE-THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL-WHETm OR Nor Tnz "FR crozgA.
DAY" RULE SHOULD BE ArPnLmE TO DETERMINE EXPIRATION OF AN INsUR&NCZ
CONTRACT BEGINN ING AT A STATED HOUR BUT EXTENDING FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF

DAYS, MONTHs, OR YEmns-In the case of Greulich v. Monnin,' an injured
person sued, and recovered judgment against, the insured driver of an
automobile. Thereafter, pursuant to local procedure, the plaintiff named
the defendant's insurance company as an additional party and sought to
recover from them on the policy. The company contended that the policy
was not in effect when the collision occurred since it had been issued to
commence at twelve o'clock noon on September 6, 1934, for a term of six
months, whereas the accident did not occur until 11:30 p.m. on March 6,
1935. The trial court, nevertheless, found in plaintiff's favor and, upon
appeal, such judgment was affirmed, the Ohio Supreme Court holding that
the general time rule as to fractional days should apply. The provision of
the policy, set out below, 2 though precise as to the time of its commencement, was ambiguous as to the precise point of its termination. As a consequence, a question arose as to whether the protection under the policy
expired at twelve o'clock noon on the last day or was to continue throughout the entire day. The court, settling that question as between the parties,
refused to compute the fractional part of the last day and held the contract to be in force throughout the entire period thereof, resting its decision squarely on the general time rule.

The holding of the Ohio court is not without some support. Yet, the
general rule is often subject to exceptions where such exceptions will
promote equity, and there is a substantial line of decisions directly opposed to that holding. There is some confusion as to when the general
rule as to fractional parts of a day should be applied. Contracts of
insurance which begin and end at a set hour of day, generally noon,
present no special problem. In the same way, those that begin on a
certain day and end on a certain day have posed no insuperable obstacle
for a court could fairly rest its decision on general rules. But where a
contract of insurance, like the instant one, begins at twelve o'clock noon
and extends for a term of days, or years, careless drafting creates a,
problem not susceptible to ordinary treatment. In Purvis v. Commercial
Casualty Company,s for example, an accident policy extended ". . . for
a term of twelve months from the third day of September, 1928, from
noon standard time. . . ." The insured was injured on the afternoon of
the last day. The insured's receipt book gave him the right to renew the
policy "on or before September 3," and the court might have seized upon
this as inferentially including the whole of the last day. That fact pro' 142 Ohio St. 113, 50 N. E. (2d) 310 (1943), affirming 45 N. E. (2d) 212 (Ohio
App. 1942). Hart, J., wrote a dissenting opinion predicated on the ground that
the statutory rule for computing time should not apply to contracts evidencing an
intent to substitute some other rule.
2 The clause read: "... said insurance shall become effective at 12 o'clock noon,
Eastern Standard Time, on the 6th day of September, 1934, and shall continue
in force for the initial term of 6 months, and for each succeeding term of 6
months, as the premium is paid."
8 160 S. C. 484, 159 S. E. 3R9 (1931).
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vided an excellent opportunity for the application of the general rule to
a situation more susceptible to its application than the present case, yet
the contract was held to have expired at noon. In Troy Automobile
Exchange v. Home Insurance Company,4 the policy ran from noon to
noon, but a certificate kept it in force ". . . from August 30, to September 30." The policy was held to have expired at noon, despite the
ambiguity in the certificate. Again, in Matthews v. Continental Casualty
Company,5 a policy insuring against accident occurring within one year
from twelve o'clock noon, December 11, 1902, was held not to cover an
accident happening at 4:00 p.m. on the last day.
Even where an insurance company has habitually accepted delinquent premiums under an accident policy providing that payment of
overdue sums revived the policy, the insurer was held not to be estopped
from claiming suspension by a tardy payment under a contract commencing and ending at noon, even though the same provided for a grace
period of five days. In this last mentioned case, the deceased was killed
at 4:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the fifth grace day. The court could
have easily decided the case under the general time rule and could have
included the entire last day in the period of coverage, but refused so
to do.
On the other hand, in granting to the insured the additional hours of
protection for which he presumably has not paid, courts have often
rested their decision upon the fact that insurance contracts are prepared
by the insurance companies, hence all ambiguities should be construed
against them and favorably to the insured. 7 In one instance, the court
disregarded fractions of a day because of the inconvenience thereby
caused.8 Still another court merely stated the general rule, without its
9
limitations, and mechanically included the whole of the last day. Support
problem.
may be found, therefore, for either side of the
The general time rule has its roots in situations created not by contract but by statutory and other legal requirements that certain acts be
done within certain time limits.' 0 To these situations, the general rule
of computing time is perfectly fair to all parties interested," but it is
an arbitrary rule formed purely as one of convenience for the courts.
It should not, however, be applied if there are means of computing the
169 N. Y. S. 796 (1918).
5 78 Ark. 40, 93 S. W. 55 (1906).
a Richardson v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 468, 137 So. 370 (1931).
7 Garelick v. Rosen, 274 N. Y. 64, 8 N. E. (2d) 279 (1937); Bouvier v. Craftsman
Ins. Co., 300 Mass. 5, 13 N. E. (2d) 619 (1938).
s Penn Plate-Glass Co. v. Spring Garden Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 255, 42 A. 138 (1899).
9 Malin v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 203 Mo. App. 153, 219 S. W. 143 (1920).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 100, 16, for example, reads: "In computing the time
for which any notice is to be given, whether required by law, order of court or
contract, the first day shall be excluded and the last included, unless the last
day is Sunday, and then it also shall be excluded." The section is included in the
chapter dealing with publication of notices. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 131,
11, as to the general rule for statutory construction.
11 Dierssen v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 204 IM. App. 240 (1917).
4
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12
time from the actual stipulations in the contract. To hold otherwise,
and thereby give the insured the benefit of the entire last day without
reference to the equities of the case, is to take refuge in a convenient
rule, and to present, gratis to the insured, additional hours of insurance
not within his contemplation at the time he made the contract.
J. E. REEVEs

NEGLIGENCE---PRoxIMATE CAUSE---WHEiHEH OR Nor OWNER AND OCCUPANT
OF BUSINESS PRE ISES iS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF REVOLVING
DOOR WHICH CAUSED INJURIES TO INVITEE WHEN PusnED RAPIDLY BY NEGLIGENT
ACT OF A THIRD PERSON-In Hansen v. Henrici's Incorporated' the Illinois
Appellate Court for the first time was called upon to decide whether or
not a business proprietor was liable for personal injuries sustained by a
customer when passing through a revolving door. The evidence therein
disclosed that, as plaintiff was leaving the revolving door on his way into
defendant's restaurant, the door was caused to move rapidly by two young
men who were departing through the same. One of the panels of the door
struck plaintiff in the back, throwing him to the ground and injuring him.
Plaintiff contended that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain
rubber and felt flanges on the top, sides, and bottom of the revolving door
of such size and in such condition as would serve to retard the speed of
the door during its revolution. Defendant contended there was no defect
in the door but, even assuming it was defective, yet on the uncontradicted
evidence such defect was not the proximate cause of the injury; that the
real cause was the force of the departing young men who pushed the
door. If there was a defect, defendant argued, it was nothing more than
a condition acted upon by a third person's independent conduct for which
the defendant should not be held liable. The evidence disclosed that while
the flanges on the door served the dual purpose of retarding speed and
keeping out cold air, still they had been permitted to become frayed and
failed to make contact with the floor and the sides of the door frame.
On these facts, verdict and judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
In support of its holding, the court cited the Massachusetts case of
Norton v. Chandler & Co., Incorporated,2 which sustains the view that
where rubber strips are placed on a revolving door for the dual purpose
of shutting out cold air and also of retarding speed, the defendant, by
allowing such strips to become so worn as to fail in their purpose, is
guilty of actionable negligence. In agreement with that position might be
4
added a later Massachusetts cases as well as two cases from Maryland.
12 It would seem that the intention, in the instant case, was to have the policy
commence and end at noon. See Corey v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 284
Mass. 283, 187 N. E. 542 (1933).
1 319 Ill. App. 458, 49
2 221 Mass. 99, 108 N.
8 Nersiff v. Worcester
349 (1928).
4 Hochschild v. Cecil,
599, 178 A. 691 (1935).

N. E. (2d) 737 (1943).
E. 897 (1915).
County Institution for Savings, 264 Mass. 228, 162 N. E.
131 Md. 70, 101 A. 700 (1917); Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md.
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Language in the Missouri case of Wiedanz v. May Department Stores
Company5 would also indicate that the courts of that state would agree
on this point. There is fair ground, therefore, for the conclusion that one
who maintains a revolving door on his premises has a duty to see that
the same is adequately equipped to prevent too rapid rotation.
Of greater significance is the holding on the contention that defendant's negligence was not a cause but only a condition through which
the independent act of a third person was able to cause injury. In support of its action in overruling such contention, the court cited the
Chandler case, 6 the Restatement of Torts,7 and New York8 and Oregon
cases. 9 In these cases it had been held that the act of a third person in
spinning the revolving door at an excessive speed was only a concurrent
cause, hence would not relieve the defendant proprietor from liability
for any negligence in construction or maintenance.' 0 By holding in the
instant case that the act of the departing customer was not a superseding cause," the court deemed it reasonable that the defendant, in
the exercise of care, should have foreseen such an occurrence. The court
might have cited still another Massachusetts case 12 and one from Maryland13 to support such holding.
It should be observed that in all of the cited cases similar to the
one under discussion the revolving door rotated with great rapidity because the door was, in some way, defective. But such a door must move
easily in order to permit ingress and egress by persons of all ages and
of varying degrees of strength. A mere showing that such a door moves
with rapidity when pushed with extra force should not, then, be sufficient
to hold the owner liable. Without evidence that he was in some way
careless, as by allowing the door to become or remain in a defective
condition, 14 liability should be denied. Evidence of negligence should,
5

156 S. W. (2d) 44 (Mo. App., 1941).

6 221 Mass. 99, 108 N. E. 897 (1915).
7 Restatement, Torts, §447, states: "The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it
a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent
conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was
done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so
acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by
the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent." The instant case would seem to fall in the first category.
8 Clark v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 227 N. Y. S. 671 (1928), affirmed in
236 N. Y. S. 767 (1929), and again affirmed in 253 N. Y. 583, 171 N. E. 792 (1930).
9 Dunn v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 149 Ore. 97, 39 P. (2d) 944 (1935).
10 The negligence there involved, however, had arisen in building a step too
close to the revolving door.
11 For an excellent discussion of proximate and intervening cause, see Mahan
v. Richardson, 284 Il. App. 493 (1936), particularly p. 498.
12 Promisel v. Hotels Statler Corp., 286 Mass. 15, 189 N. E. 804 (1934).
is Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 178 A. 691 (1935).
14 Wiedanz v. May Department Store Co., 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (Mo. App., 1941).
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properly, be regarded as necessary since the owner or occupant of business premises owes to his invitees only the duty to keep his premises
in a reasonably safe condition. The law does not make him an insurer
W. S. GRorEFELD
of his customer's safety.' 5
OR NOT
TORTS-RESORT TO OR CONDUCT OF LEGAL RnvEnIEs-WHMTHR
FoRMER CORPORATE OFciAL WHO PROSECUTES SUr iN T=E NAME OF DEFUNCT
CORPoRATioN is LiABLE To DEFENDANT THeMN ron ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
EXPENSES INCURRED IN DEFENDING SUCH Surr-In the recent case of London
& Lancashire Indemnity Company of America v. Duner,l the plaintiff
insurance company sued to recover damages resulting from the defendant's alleged wrongful prosecution of a suit in the name of a dissolved
corporation. The alleged wrongful suit had been commenced in a state
court by a verified complaint which declared that the plaintiff therein
was a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of
the State of Illinois. Defendant herein signed and verified such complaint
as president of the corporation. As a matter of fact, the corporation had
at one time existed but, more than five years prior to such suit, it had
been dissolved. 2 Such fact was, however, unknown to the present plaintiff,
defendant therein, and it removed the cause to the federal court which
dismissed the action on other grounds.8 Upon discovering the fact of such
dissolution, the insurance company instituted the present action to secure
reimbursement for the expenses thus incurred, but the trial court found
in defendant's favor. On appeal, this judgment was reversed with directions to enter one in favor of plaintiff.
The question presented has but few parallels in the decisions of
other jurisdictions and is of particular interest in Illinois as it has not
been the subject of prior determination in this state. 4 Under the common
law, the gist of such an action would have been malice and want of
probable cause. 5 But later cases in other jurisdictions have decided that
an individual who brings an unauthorized action,6 perfects an unauthor15 Antibus v. W. T. Grant Co., 297 I. App. 363, 17 N. E. (2d) 610 (1938); Jones
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 273 Ill. App. 183 (1933), Deitz v. Belleville Co-op.
Grain Co., 273 Ill. App. 164 (1933); Farina v. First Nat. Bank, 72 Ohio App. 109,
51 N. E. (2d) 36 (1943).
1 135 F. (2d) 895, 146 A. L. R. 1119 (1943). Evans, C. J., concurred in the
result but expressed the belief that had scienter been lacking he would have held
in defendant's favor.
2 135 F. (2d) 895 at 897. By statute, suits by or against the dissolved corporation may be conducted if instituted within two years after dissolution has occurred, but not thereafter: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.94.
S C. T. C. Inv. Co. v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 116 F. (2d) 741 (1941).
4 The Illinois cases referred to by the court were recognized as not being
directly in point, for one, Dawson v. Ellis, 151 IMI. App. 92 (1909), merely defines
a tort, while the other, Philpot v. Taylor, 75 Ill. 309, 20 Am. Rep. 241 (1874), distinguished on the facts, based its result upon fraud as being the primary wrongful act on defendant's part.
5 T. E. Hill Co. v. Contractors' Supply & Equipment Co., 249 Ill. 304, 94 N. E.
544, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456 (1911), affirming 156 Ill. App. 270 (1910).
6 Moulton v. Lowe, 32 Me. 466 (1851).
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s
ized appeal,7 makes an unauthorized arrest, or levies an unauthorized
9
attachment is liable to the defendant for the trouble and expense caused
the latter solely because of lack of authority. Furthermore, in one state,
the matter has even been made the basis of a statute which, to prevent
vexatious litigation, allows a recovery of damages against one suing in
0
the name of another without right.' It would seem, therefore, that the
elements of malice and want of probable cause have been deleted, particularly in actions involving a lack of authority on the part of the one
using the name of plaintiff.
It might appear that defendant's position, as director and president
of his corporation, should give him the right to sue on obligations owing
to the corporation so long as he has no knowledge of its dissolution.
Certainly, in such a case, malice could not be inferred and would probably be absent. The court, however, disposed of this point in clear
language that as the right to sue, which at one time had existed, was
ended two years after corporate dissolution, there was, therefore, no
entity of any kind in existence which could grant authority either directly or by ratification. Necessarily, therefore, defendant had taken an
improper liberty in using the name of another in prosecuting the earlier
suit. Defendant further argued that, as a corporate agent acting within
the scope of his authority, he should not be affected by the subsequent
death or dissolution of the principal without his knowledge. While the
court assumed that, as a general rule, an agent is not liable on a contract executed on behalf of a principal without knowledge of the death
of the latter," it dismissed such argument on the ground that the action
was one in tort while the rule was applicable only to suits on contracts.
It would seem then that defendant's activity in maintaining the original
suit was entirely without warrant and his ignorance of the fact of dissolution was utterly inexcusable. The actual outcome of the case is,
therefore, undoubtedly the correct one.
Left unanswered, however, is the question as to the proper method
which defendant should have pursued to vindicate the original claim of
his corporation, assuming there was one, without exposing himself to

7

Hawes v. Dunlop, 121 N. Y. S. 380 (1910); Streeper v. Ferris, 64 Tex. 12 (1885).

8 Smith v. Hyndman, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 554 (1852).

9 Bond v. Chapin, 49 Mass. (8 Metc.) 31 (1844).
(1909), §§70-1; Thompson's Laws N. Y. (1939), Ch. 6,
§§70-1, p. 252. Such statute, however, has been construed not to apply to a mistaken appeal by a widow, in her own name, to review an order declaring her deceased husband an incompetent at the suit of a relative. The court, in Hawes v.
Dunlop, 121 N. Y. S. 380 (1910), deemed such situation as not being within the
contemplation of the statute.
1 Carriger's Adm'r v. Whittington's Adm'r, 26 Mo. 311, 72 Am. Dec. 212 (1858);
Catlin v. Reed, 141 Okla. 14, 283 P. 549, 67 A. L. R. 1410 (1930); Ginochio v. Porcella, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 277 (1855); Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 282,
39 Am. Dec. 76 (1842). But see contra, Weiss v. Baum, 217 N. Y. S. 820 (1926);
Rowland v. Hall, 106 N. Y. S. 55 (1907); Attleboro Nat. Bank v. Wendell, 19 N. Y.
S. 45, 64 Hun 208 (1892); Farmers' Co-op. Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26
N. E. 110 (1890); Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hatfield, 48 N. B. 13, 58 D. L. R. 136
(1921). See also annotation in 100 A. L. R. 533 (1936).
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liability. Upon dissolution and expiration of the statutory period, corporate claims and property rights do not vanish. 12 If no liquidation proceedings are undertaken,' 3 the property and other rights of the enterprise fall upon the shareholders as tenants in common, subject to the
rights of any unpaid creditors. 14 In that capacity, and upon proper disclosure of the facts, defendant and his co-shareholders would have been
justified in proceeding to liquidate the defunct corporation's assets for
the purpose of distribution. As the holders of the right of action, no
15
and litigation
question could have been advanced against that suit,
such as that in the instant case would then have been made unnecessary.
A. M. LunwiG
12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (Perm. Ed. 1942),
Vol. 16, §8130, p. 871. The rule may have been different at common law, Life
Association of America v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315 (1882), but the more modern view
is as stated in the texts: Danville Seminary v. Mott, 136 Ill. 289, 28 N. E. 54 (1891).
Is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.86, authorizes an application in equity for
that purpose.
14 Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. 16, §8134, p. 875. See also Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.
v. Van Winkle, 221 F. 590 (1915), cert. den. 241 U. S. 670, 36 S. Ct. 554, 60 L. Ed.
1230 (1916).
15 Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. App. 479, 124 S. E. 54 (1924).

